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AN ADDRESS BY THE GOVERNOR
OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA,
DR. C. N. ISONG, TO THE LOCAL
CENTRE OF THE INSTITUTE OF
BANKERS, LAGOS
ON 21ST FEBRUARY, 1969

In the past year, far from collapsing, the
performance of the economy was most
encouraging. A rise in domestic food
production contributed immensely to the
relative price stability achieved during the
year. Although the volume of agricultural
exports declined marginally as compared
with that of 1967, yet this was due largely to
an act of God over which no one had any
control. Poor rains during the planting
season adversely affected the output of
groundnuts. As local industries took advantage of the increased protection stemming
from measures to restrict imports, output
of manufactured goods increased substantially during the year; and whereas at
its lowest point the production of crude
petroleum had dropped to barely 10%
of the pre-war level, before the end of the
year it had risen to over 50% of the pre-war
mark. The projection is that the pre-war
output will be exceeded before the end of
this year.

Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies
and gentlemen:
Once again it is my privilege to speak to
you on the occasion .of the Annual Dinner
of your Organisation. It is a privilege that
I particularly welcome because it gives me
an opportunity to express my appreciation
of the role that the banking community
played in the progress that the economy
made last year. I sincerely hope that we
can continue to count on your co-operation
in the future, particularly when the time
comes for us to embark on the stupendous
task of rebuilding our war-torn economy.
Mr. President, you will recollect that
when last I addressed this distinguished body,
I enumerated a number of difficulties which
confronted us at the time as a financial
community. While we are not out of the
woods yet, I am happy to state that these
difficulties have been courageously tackled
and that it is possible now to face the new
year with a greater degree of optimism. We
have heard much in the past about the
remarkable resilience of the Nigerian
economy, but have never had any occasion
to test it. The present crisis has no doubt
convinced even the chronic sceptic of the
basic strength of our economy. It is an open
secret that at the onset of the war, the rebels
stated categorically that the Nigerian economy would collapse under the strain of the
war and that the Federal Military Govern~ent would thereby be forced to modify
its terms for settlement with them. While it
is true that the war has imposed a tremendous strain on our economy, I am sur.e you
will all agree with me that the rebels have
once again misplaced their expectations, for
the pressure of economic factors which they
expected to force the Federal Military
Government to change its terms for settlement has failed to materialize. On the
contr~ry, our economy has remained strong
and the Federal Government's objective of
reuniting the country remains unchanged.

As was to be expected, credit to
Government from the banking system
inc~eased m~kedly. during the year. But,
unhke expenences m countries in similar
situations, the increase in government
bor~owing did not produce any undue
strams on the monetary system. During
the year, while the price index for the
middle-income group in Lagos rose by
3.2%, the all-cities consumer price index
for . the lower;inco~e group actually
declined by 0.1 %- This remarkable price
stability may be attributed to a number of
factors, the most important one being the
fact that most of our foodstuffs are locally
produced and the output has continued to
increase in spite of the crisis. In addition,
we have observed that credit to the private
sector actually fell as a result of an understandable slowdown _in business activity.
These two factors, m our view jointly
pr?duced the moderating effect on donsumer
pnces.

7

In the field of monetary policy, 1968 saw
a reduction in the Central Bank's discount
rate which was necessitated by a number of
considerations: In the first place, we found
ourselves in a situation where the Government was the largest single borrower. In
order to keep down its cost of borrowing, it
was necessary to reduce the Bank's discount
rate. Moreover, on account of the slowdown in economic activity the commercial
ban~s had become extremely liquid; by
makmg the cost of borrowing a little
che~per to the business community, it could
be mduced to borrow more. As is now
customary, as soon as the reduction in the
Bank's discount rate was announced, there
was a downward adjustment in- the commercial banks' prime rates.
During the period under review, we were
able to check the rapid deterioration in the
balance of payments position. As opposed
to the sharp fall in foreign exchange reserves
in 1967, the level of reserves was kept more
or less stable in 1968. In my address last
year I made particular reference to our
balance of payments position because, as
our reserves were falling rapidly, we
observed that there was vicious campaign
against the Nigerian £. As you will recall,
Mr. President, the international value of the
Nigerian£ was put to the test initially by the
rapid depletion of our foreign exchange
reserves which was the direct consequence
of the current national crisis. This situation
was further aggravated by the hawking
of the Nigerian £ in international financial markets by the rebels for their
purchase of arms. Speculative pressures
against the Nigerian £ assumed alarming
proportions when sterling was devalued
and the Federal Government rightly refused
to follow suit. A number of speculators
even went to the extent of naming the exact
date that the Nigerian £ would be devalued.
Consequently, holders of the Nigerian £
did their best to get rid of it, not only
because they gained by exchanging the
Nigerian £ for sterling but, more importantly, because they believed that the
Nigerian £ would be devalued at a higher
rate than sterling.
I used this very forum last year to
announce that it was not the intention of
the Federal Government to devalue the
Nigerian £; a whole year has passed since I
made that pronouncement and I want to

repeat it here tonight that the Federal
Government's policy in this respect has
remained unchanged. It is now left to the
business community to stop being nervous
and show more confidence in the strength
of our currency. When it is recalled that
!ast year we succeeded in raising our quota
m the I.M.F. to. $100 million, and that
we are yet to avail ourselves of our right
to draw on the vast resources of that body,
there should be no genuine cause to continue to be nervous.
Mr. President, my brief review of the
events of last year will not be complete
if I fail to make mention of the currency
exchange exercise which is still occupying
much of our time today. It is no secret that
the currency exchange exercise was deemed
necessary as war strategy, since the rebels
were using our currency to purchase arms.
Although as of January 23rd, 1968 the major
part of the exchange exercise had ended
(thanks. to the magnificent co-operation
we received from the banking community),
a substantial part of it, and in fact the most
difficult part, still remains to be carried out.
By this I mean the exchange exercise to be
conducted in the three eastern states.
During the initial phase of the exercise in the
South-Eastern State, we discovered that a
substantial part of the old notes which the
rebels had taken out of the country had
illegally found its way back into the country
and the amount of notes actually collected
was more than double the amount estimated
to be in circulation in that area. People
who may have paid as little as 5/- or even
less for a one £N note wanted the Government to exchange it for them at its full face
value. Mr. President, the rest of the story
is now quite familiar. After the initial payment of up to £N50 per person and £N500
per company had been made, the Government had to freeze all bank accounts in
the area and all deposits outstanding with
the exchange teams. A panel was then set
up to investigate the legitimacy of every
bank account and tC?am deposit. It is hoped
that all cases of fraud, especially the big
ones, will be detected by the panel and all
those involved in them will be handed
over to the law enforcement agencies for
prosecution, while the innocent ones should
not be made to suffer in any way. While
our method of fraud detection in the
remaining areas of the eastern states
had greatly improved, the running
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shown elsewhere, may not have to use the
big stick at all. Up to now, the cordial
relationship between the Central Bank
and the commercial banks has not depended
on the exercise of legal powers. By and large,
we have received the utmost co-operation
from the banks. It is our hope that this
co-operation will continue. I have no reason
to think otherwise.

battle between us and the criminals who
want to get rich overnight has continued
unabated. We are prepared to fight them
on all fronts.
Mr. President, as you are well aware,
several of the policy developments that took
place in the financial sector during 1968
were tailored to the long-range needs of
the economy. One such development was
the introduction of treasury certificates in
the money market. For some time we had
felt the need to introduce to the money
market a medium-term instrument longer
than the treasury bills but shorter than the
5-Year Development Stocks. The obvious
candidate in this field was the treasury
certificate, which, we are pleased to announce,
has proved to be very popular. As we continue to develop our money and capital
markets, it is our hope that more
instruments of borrowing will be introduced
in order to gi_ve the market both the breadth
and depth that are necessary if it is fully
to serve the growing needs of our economy.

An important development in banking
)egislation, which I should ment,ion tonight,
1s the repeal of the Banking Act 1958 {as
amended in 1962) and its replacement by
Decree No. 1 cited as the Banking Decree
1969, which came into effect on 7th
Feburary 1969. Although the Decree retains
all the provisions of the old law, it has
added and amplified further certain regulatory powers of the Central Bank over the
commercial banks. Most important, however, is that conditions for the issue of a
banking licence have been brought in line
with Section IO of the Companies Decree
1968. The Banking Decree for the first
time also applies to discount and acceptance
houses, building societies and all other forms
of financial institutions.

The past year also saw a number of
far-reaching amendments to the Central
Bank of Nigeria Act. Among these, Decree
No. 50 has several significant implications
in the long-term development of the
financial system and therefore deserves
special mention: An important change
introduced by this Decree was the complete
take-over by the Central Bank of the
financing of marketing boards' crops.
We fully recognise that crop financing is of
immense importance to the conomy and
the change in this respect was dictated by
circumstances, the facts of which are well
known to all concerned. In any event, it is
our belief that the take-over will free
commercial banks' resources to be used in
other areas such as small-scale industries,
which are in dire need offunds for expansion.

There is of course Decree No. 5-1 which,
among other things, requires all foreign.
companies operating in the country to
register as Nigerian concerns. When the
Decree was first issued, most foreign
companies - including commercial banks
- expressed concern about its effect on their
operations. I am sure that commercial
banks, after a more careful study of the
implications of Section X of that Decree
have now realised that it will not in any way
interfere with the smooth running of their
companies.
CONCLUSION

Mr. President, I am happy to note that
in the past year the deterioration in the
economy was successfully arrested. In fact,
from now on, unless the ~xtremely unexpected happens, conditions will continue
to improve. While I do not wish to minimise
the magnitude of the tasks that lie ahead
of us, I feel confident that the worst is over.

The Decree also gave the Central Bank
the power to fix the minimum percentage of
commercial bank loans that must go to
indigenous companies. Quite frankly, we
believed that this type of legislation was
long overdue, considering the extent of
complaints from indigenous businesses that
commercial banks discriminated against
them. It is our belief that the very existence
of such a law on our statute books will
be enough to spur the banks to action,
and the Central Bank, as experience has

I wish to thank the members
organisation for their contribution
a solid foundation for a lasting
structure in Nigeria. That our
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of your
in laying
financial
financial

system has withstood the national cns1s
is at once a worthy testimony to the noble
profession of banking and an acknowledgment of your devotion to the delicate art
of banking management. I would like to end

on the note with which I began this address:
Now that we have passed through the strains
and stresses of yet another year, honesty
and devotion to duty must continue to be
our watch word.

PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
1966

This paper presents the results of the
latest annual survey of private foreign
investmen_t in Nigeria. As in previous years,
the enqmry was confined to companies
which were wholly or partly owned by foreign
nationals. The survey covered 594 selected
establishments, of which 54 per cent
responded, on the basis of which estimates
. were made. This compared with 57 per cent
response in the survey for 1965. The low
rate of response was due to the political
crisis in the country in 1967, when the survey
was conducted. The worsening of political
conditions, as was to be expected, seem
to have affected the small business establishments more adversely than the big ones:
the ratio of response for the former group
was lower than that for the latter category.
However, the low ratio of response from the
small enterprises does not very materially
affect the result of the survey since the bigger
enterprises account for the bulk of the
capital flows.

are presented data on capital movements
by origin. It will be noted that most of
the drop in net capital inflow is accounted
for by the sharp drop in the gross inflow
of capital from the United States. With
gross capital inflow from the United
States dropping from £N19.8 million in
1965 to £N8:1. million in 1966 and gross
outflow decbmng only marginally from
£NI .1 million to £N0.9 million, net inflow
declined by £NI 1.5 million from the 1965
level of £Nl8.7 million. Net inflow of
capital from "others" also declined from
£N4.7 million in 1965 to £N3.0 million in
1966. Net inflows from the two other
sources the United Kirigdom and
Western Europe - increased but by not
enough to make up for the drop in the
inflows from the United States and "others".
Net private capital inflow from the
United Kingdom which had declined from
£N28.0 million in 1964 to £N21.0 million
in 1965, increased in 1966 to £N25.6 million.
The pattern of the movement of net capital
inflow originating in Western Europe
between 1964 and 1966 is the same as that
of United Kingdom origin. Having declined
from £N15.3 million in 1964 to £Nl0.8
million in 1965, net capital inflow from
Western Europe increased by 2.8 to £N13.6
million in 1966.

Flow of private foreign capita)

The upward movement in gross inflow
of private foreign capital which occurred
between 1962 and 1965 was reversed in
1966-see Table A. Gross private capital
inflow in 1966, estimated at £N86. 9 million,
was £N16.l million or 15.6 per cent below
the 1965 level. It should be noted that even
with this fall, gross capital inflow in 1966
was higher than in 1961, 1962 or 1963.
Gross outflow of private foreign capital also
declined. The estimated outflow of £N37 .5
million compares with a gross outflow of
£N47.8 million in 1965. This is the first
time, since 1961 when this survey started,
that gross outflow has declined.

On the whole, the United Kingdom
continued to be the single most important
source of foreign capital in Nigeria.
The net inflow from this source - £N25.6
million - was 52 per cent of total net
inflow in 1966. The 1966 net inflow from
Western Europe of £Nl3.6 million was
27 per cent of the total inflow during the year.
The United States, which in 1964 and 1965
looked as if it might displace Western
Europe as the second most important source
of net capital inflow to Nigeria, recorded a

With gross capital inflow declining by
£N 16.1 million and gross capital outflow,
by £NI0.3 million, net capital inflow declined in 1966 by £N5.6 million. In Table A
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